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Abstract 
 
This paper proposes a new measure of firm information asymmetry. The information asymmetry 
measure is based on causality tests relating repurchase information to firm returns. Our results 
indicate that firms with greater information asymmetry show larger abnormal returns surrounding 
the announcement of an open market share repurchase. This new information asymmetry proxy 
remains a significant explanatory factor for announcement abnormal returns after controlling for 
other conventional information asymmetry proxies, such as firm size, number of analysts 
following, and analyst forecast dispersion. Further, our measure of information asymmetry is 
positively related to long-term abnormal returns at one, two, and three-year windows. 
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1.  Introduction 
While the market response to open market repurchase announcements is on average 
positive, the market responds strongly to some announcements and not strongly to others.1 We 
examine if the degree of firm information asymmetry helps to explain the market reaction to open 
market share repurchase announcements. Our measure of information asymmetry is unique in this 
context and is derived from time series regressions based on Granger (1969) and Sims (1972). 
While other information asymmetry proxies in the literature capture some aspects of information 
asymmetry, ours is tailored specifically to the repurchase decision. Specifically, our information 
asymmetry proxy is based on dynamic causal relations between stock price performance of firms 
and the announcement of share repurchases during the period 1990-2012. Our information 
asymmetry proxy helps to explain announcement returns even after controlling for other 
conventional information asymmetry proxies, such as firm size, number of analysts following, and 
the dispersion of analyst forecasts.  
Market reactions to share repurchases may be related to the perceived motivation and 
information of the repurchase. The literature provides evidence of the signaling hypothesis (Louis 
and White, 2007). According to the signaling hypothesis, the motivation for a stock repurchase is 
to signal undervaluation of a firm to investors. Dittmar (2000) argues that information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders can induce firm undervaluation in the market, and that a stock 
repurchase is the process of releasing information that is available only to managers to the market. 
Therefore, the information signaled is usually assumed to be firm undervaluation although other 
motivations for repurchases exist (i.e., stock-based compensation plans, reducing excess cash, 
                                                          
1 Comment and Jarrell (1991), Chan et al. (2004), and Grullon and Michaely (2004), among others, document positive 
abnormal returns following the announcement of repurchases.  
3 
 
etc.).2 The survey of managers by Brav et al. (2005) indicates that undervaluation is the primary 
reason for repurchasing. However, the literature has not reached a consensus on whether or not 
managers are able to time repurchases correctly to take advantage of periods of mispricing. 
Ikenberry et al. (1995), Brockman and Chung (2001), Cook et al. (2004), and Peyer and Vermaelen 
(2009) conclude that managers are able to time the market while Dittmar and Field (2013) find 
that frequent repurchasers, who account for the majority of repurchases, are unable and likely not 
attempting to time the market. Similarly, Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) show that infrequent 
repurchases show a stronger stock price reaction at announcement. Yook (2010) finds that 
repurchase announcement abnormal returns are positively related to firm undervaluation and that 
frequent repurchasing firms do not show positive long-term abnormal returns. Similarly, Babenko 
et al. (2012) demonstrate that not all repurchases are credible signals of undervaluation. Further, 
Dittmar and Field (2013) find that the market is not able to determine which repurchases signal 
undervaluation at the time of the announcement.  
Regardless of whether or not the average repurchase indicates timing, it seems clear that 
some repurchases are informed and others are uninformed. Thus, establishing which firms have 
relatively higher levels of information asymmetry in the repurchase decision allows us to identify 
which repurchases send credible signals and which do not. Others have examined conventional 
                                                          
2 The literature shows several reasons for corporate managers to distribute cash through share repurchases. For 
example, share repurchases provide corporate managers with flexibility in terms of timing and the amount of cash 
payouts (e.g., Grullon and Michaely, 2002), so many researchers hypothesize that firms use share repurchases to pay 
out temporary cash flows (Guay and Harford, 2000; Jagannathan et al. 2000; Dittmar, 2000; Lee and Rui, 2007).   
Some authors hypothesize that firms use share repurchases to distribute excess capital. This excess capital hypothesis 
relates to the free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986) in that excess capital gives rise to agency costs of 
overinvestments unless it is distributed to shareholders (e.g., Dittmar, 2000).  Some studies provide evidence that the 
presence of stock option programs influences firms’ decisions about share repurchases (Jolls, 1998; Fenn and Liang, 
2001; Kahle, 2002; Jun, Jung and Walkling, 2009); that firms use share repurchases to defend themselves against 
takeovers (Denis, 1990; Billett and Xue, 2007). Tax motives may also influence decisions to repurchase shares 
because, as compared to dividends, share repurchases provide shareholders with tax benefits (Barclay and Smith, 
1988). 
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and general information asymmetry proxies such as firm size in examining the market response to 
share repurchases (Chan et al., 2004). However, we propose a repurchase specific information 
asymmetry proxy in order to better understand the market reaction to share repurchase 
announcements.  
 The intuition of our information asymmetry measure is straightforward. If a given 
repurchase announcement contains predictive information about future stock returns, then it 
follows that the repurchase is likely based on information possessed by the manager and not the 
market. In short, firms with higher information asymmetry are more likely to show stronger stock 
market returns following the open market repurchase. Thus, our measure of information 
asymmetry is based on time series causality regressions for each repurchasing firm in the sample. 
Each repurchase announcement is categorized as either an informed or uninformed repurchase.  If 
lagged repurchase information predicts future (six month) returns, with a statistically significant 
causal relation, that repurchase is labeled as informed. Our interpretation of this is that these 
informed repurchases are for firms where the level of information asymmetry is sufficiently high 
as to render the information of the announcement economically meaningful. 
 Our results indicate that the majority of repurchases are not informed. Regardless of the 
repurchase measure used, we find that approximately 7% of all repurchase announcements are 
informed. Our use of the term “informed” in this case is to describe those firms for which the 
lagged repurchase variable predicts six month future returns in causality regressions. This is 
consistent with Dittmar and Field (2013) who find that most repurchases are by frequent 
repurchasers and that such transactions are not at relatively low prices.  
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 Informed repurchases result in higher announcement returns than non-informed 
repurchases, which indicates that the market generally identifies firms with greater information 
asymmetry at the time of the repurchase announcement. The difference between informed and 
uninformed abnormal returns is increased for small firms, but the difference is non-existent (i.e., 
insignificant) for large firms. Thus, smaller firms that are likely to have higher levels of 
information asymmetry may be further bifurcated based on our more precise measure of 
information asymmetry. Specifically, the size of the firm does not fully explain firm level 
information asymmetry in the context of repurchases and our time series based measure offers an 
alternative measure specific to this purpose. Our results hold when controlling for the size of the 
repurchase, the frequency of repurchases for a firm, and other traditional proxies for information 
asymmetry including firm size, analysts following, and the dispersion of analyst forecasts. Finally, 
we find that firms that we identify as informed outperform the market and other repurchasers in 
terms of long-term abnormal returns in the one, two, and three year windows.  
 Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we consider the motivation for using the 
dynamic causal relation between returns and stock repurchases as the proxy for information 
asymmetry in stock repurchases. In Section 3, we describe the data and methodology. In Section 
4, we present the empirical evidence. In Section 5, we conclude.  
2. Information Asymmetry and Repurchases  
 The literature evaluating the ability of managers to time repurchases assumes firm 
information asymmetry that requires the manager to signal full information to the market. The 
market, which is aware of the information asymmetry, responds positively to the announcement 
of share repurchases. The explicit link between information asymmetry and the market response 
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to share repurchases has received less attention. Chan et al. (2004) find that small firms are 
associated with larger announcement abnormal returns relative to large firms upon the 
announcement of a repurchase program. However, they focus on firm size as a proxy for likely 
misvaluation as opposed to information asymmetry. As the literature has used firm size 
(Vermaelen, 1981; Corwin, 2003; Zhang, 2006) as a proxy for information asymmetry, it may be 
inferred that firms with greater information asymmetry show a relatively larger announcement 
return. However, firm size is not a direct measure of whether or not the repurchasing firm truly 
possessed information not contained in the price at the time of the repurchase.  
Similarly, the literature has used the dispersion of analyst forecasts (Babenko et al., 2012; 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; Diether et al., 2002) and the number of analysts following 
the firm (Chang et al., 2000; Hong et al., 2000; Bushman et al., 2004; Zhang, 2006; Babenko et 
al., 2012) as proxies for information asymmetry. These measures are also not a direct measure of 
whether or not a given repurchase contains information not possessed by the market. The preferred 
way to identify truly informed repurchases is by examining the return performance of repurchasing 
firms – which is the focus of this paper.    
There can be some concerns about using stock returns following repurchases to establish 
information asymmetry or to identify which repurchases are truly informed. For instance, it is 
possible that the positive performance used to establish information asymmetry is due to factors 
not signaled by the repurchase, in which case using the performance would yield a potentially 
biased identification of an informed repurchase. Similarly, it is plausible that a firm correctly 
signals undervaluation via a repurchase announcement, but the market does not correct the price 
in time for our measure to capture the correction. In short, our measure may commit both Type I 
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and Type II errors in establishing informed repurchases. However, given that our information 
asymmetry proxy is based on a statistical test from causality regressions, the results are unlikely 
to be systematically biased. In order to alleviate this concern, we relate our information asymmetry 
measure to long-term abnormal returns, in addition to short-term abnormal returns, which capture 
post announcement performance and control for systemic factors which may drive returns.  
 There may be other problems with our approach. It may be argued that if markets are 
efficient, then announcement abnormal returns should correctly signal which repurchases are 
informed. However, the literature has established a post-repurchase announcement drift that would 
suggest that using the announcement abnormal returns may be a poor proxy for information 
asymmetry (Ikenberry et al., 1995; Grullon and Michaely, 2004; Chan et al. 2004). Chan et al. 
(2004) note that “the evidence, however, indicates that the initial market reaction is not a good 
predictor of long-term abnormal performance.” This statement is related to their results which 
suggest that the initial market reaction is not only incomplete, but actually unrelated to subsequent 
return performance. Overall, the literature suggests that the market does not, on average, price the 
information of repurchase announcements immediately at the time of the announcement.  
3. Data and Methodology 
 Data on open market share repurchases is from SDC Platinum. We collect data on all 
announced share repurchases from 1980-2012. For each repurchase, we identify the date of the 
announcement and the size of the announced repurchase. Following Grullon and Michaely (2004) 
and Babenko et al. (2012), we do not exclude financial firms from our sample. We construct two 
measures of repurchases. The first is a simple indicator which is equal to one if there is a repurchase 
announced in a given month and is zero otherwise. The second, which is consistent with Babenko 
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et al. (2012), is the dollar value of the repurchase divided by the market value of the firm. Using 
the dollar value of the repurchase rather than the number of shares is due to data availability in 
SDC Platinum. Specifically, the dollar value of the repurchase is nearly always reported (roughly 
90% reporting) while the number of shares sought is rarely reported (less than 25% reporting). 
 We then link the sample of repurchasing firms to CRSP in order to obtain firm stock return 
and market capitalization data. We obtain return data over the period from 1980-2012. Event study 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated following Babenko et al. (2012). Specifically, 
we use a market model approach with an estimation window of (-252 to -44) and a three-day event 
window of (-1 to +1) to construct CAR. CAR is the difference between the observed return and 
predicted return based on the market model.  
Our repurchase sample is linked to Fama and French (1993) factors for our long-term 
abnormal return calculation. Post-repurchase announcement long-term abnormal returns are 
calculated following Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) by using the Fama-French (1993) three-factor 
model. We form equally-weighted calendar time portfolios for firms repurchasing in the past 12, 
24, or 36 months depending on the horizon of interest. We then run the following regression for 
the time series of portfolio returns: 
            (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) =  𝛼𝑗 + 𝑏𝑗(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑐𝑗𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝑑𝑗𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                   (1) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the monthly return of firm i in calendar month t. 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 are the risk-free rate 
(one-month T-Bill) and the return on the market (equally weighted CRSP return index) for 
calendar month t, respectively. 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  are the return on the size and book-to-market 
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factors in calendar month t, respectively. Portfolios are formed for the full sample as well as 
numerous bifurcations based on information asymmetry proxies.   
In Table 1 we report summary statistics for the size of the repurchase (repurchase dollar 
value divided by firm market value), the value of the repurchase (in millions of dollars), the 
announcement CAR, the number of analysts following the firm close to the time of the repurchase 
announcement, and the dispersion of analyst forecasts close to the time of the announcement. We 
document that the average repurchase announcement is for 8.59% of total firm market value,  has 
a value of $168.38 million and an announcement CAR of 2.77%. We note that we are able to 
calculate announcement abnormal returns for 8,859 repurchase announcements over the 1990-
2012 period. We compare this to other studies and find that our sample is consistent with prior 
work. For instance, Babenko et al. (2012) find 5,827 announcements over the period 1993-2008. 
Over this same period, we find a very similar number of deals (6,128) despite the fact that we do 
not explicitly follow their filtering criteria. Differences between sample size in Babenko et al. 
(2012) and our paper are due to our paper including more years, both before and after the period 
examined in Babenko et al.  
We find mean and median event (event days -1 to +1) cumulative abnormal returns in Table 
1 of 2.77% and 1.78%, respectively, which are both statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
announcement CAR in Table 1 is consistent with Grullon and Michaely (2004) who find mean and 
median CAR over the same three day window (-1 to +1) of 2.71% and 1.82%, respectively, over 
the 1980 to 1997 period. The number of analysts is available for 6,518 repurchase announcements 
and the dispersion of analyst forecasts is available for 5,600 repurchase announcements (compared 
to 8,859 repurchases for which we can calculate CAR). We later use the median number of analysts 
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(five) and analyst dispersion (4%) to bifurcate our sample into low and high information 
asymmetry groups for long-term abnormal returns calculations.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 In the appendix, we discuss potential information asymmetry between inside managers and 
outside investors and how to test this information asymmetry by applying Sims’ (1972) two-sided 
regression based causality test. By using this test and considering different degrees of information 
asymmetry, we can tell whether inside managers indeed have information advantages over outside 
investors. 
 Based on the discussions in the appendix (see Proposition 1, equations (A.11) and (A.12)), 
the Granger causality in (A.11), which is based on the two-sided regression by Sims (1972, 
Theorem 2), can be tested based on the usual (equivalent) one-sided Granger-causality tests in 
(A.12).  Therefore, we investigate the relationship between monthly returns and manager’s share 
repurchase announcements using the following  regression, where the inclusion of lagged values 
of market returns helps us to control for potential feedback in share repurchase decisions:  
                              𝑅𝑡 = 𝛾 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑅𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑡−𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑚
𝑗=1 + 𝜂𝑡,                                                               (2) 
where 𝑅𝑡 is the monthly return for a given firm in month t from CRSP. 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑡 is the repurchase 
variable for a given firm in month t which is measured either as an indicator or as a percent of the 
firm to be repurchased. Specifically, REP is an indicator equal to one if the current month contains 
a repurchase and is zero otherwise. REP% is the percent of the firm to be repurchased in a given 
month and is equal to the dollar value of the repurchase divided by the market value of the firm in 
a given month.  
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 To make inferences about potential information asymmetry, we analyze the characteristics 
of the coefficients. Since this causality test can be interpreted as being based on information 
asymmetry as discussed above (or as in the appendix), we interpret a finding of a causal relation 
from share repurchase to market return as evidence of share repurchase decisions based on 
information asymmetry. Based on the discussions in the appendix, we test whether the individual 
coefficients of lagged repurchases are zero to see whether share repurchases Granger-cause 
returns.  Share repurchase, REP, is said to Granger-cause return if we reject: 
 H0: 𝑏𝑗= 0, for all j in (2). 
In other words, the share repurchase, REP, Granger-causes returns if lagged REP can predict 
current returns, controlling for past returns. If the null H0: 𝑏𝑗= 0, for all j in (2) is rejected, we find 
evidence of market timing using the share repurchase, REP. This specification also allows us to 
test the net (cumulative) effect of lagged share repurchase on market returns. Specifically, we test: 
 
 H0 : ∑ 𝑏𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 = 0 in (2), 
which allows us to test for the sign of the causal relation. If we find the net effect (sum of 
coefficients, ∑ 𝑏𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 ) is significantly positive, the sign of the causation is consistent with the 
expectation that managers increase share repurchases in anticipation of an increase in stock return 
(i.e., market timing).  
As discussed above, our measure of information asymmetry is originally based on two-
sided causality regression (i.e., equation (A.11) in the appendix) developed by Sims (1972). Our 
time-series model acknowledges information asymmetry between potentially informed managers 
and other uninformed investors. In this situation, repurchase announcements may contain 
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information about future stock returns. Our model ultimately tests the predictive power of 
repurchase announcements, which we equate to information asymmetry.  
The causality regression in (2) is conducted for each firm in the sample and as such, 8,859 
(7,781) individual regressions are run using REP (REP%) over the full time series of available 
returns. An F-test of the significance of the lagged repurchase terms is conducted and the p-value 
of this test is used to determine the predictive power of repurchase announcements. If the p-value 
for an individual regression is less than 0.05, we conclude that the repurchase announcement is 
predictive of future returns. The predictive power based on the p-value is then interpreted as a 
measure of information asymmetry.  
Informed repurchases indicate the presence of information asymmetry at the time of the 
repurchase announcement. This approach differs from other information asymmetry measures 
such as firm size and those based on analysts (e.g., number of analysts following, and analyst 
forecast dispersion). While a priori information asymmetry proxies have the advantage of yielding 
predictions and possibly tradable results, they are limited in the sense that they capture relatively 
crude elements of information asymmetry. For example, a small firm may indeed have a relatively 
high degree of information asymmetry, but that fact does not speak to the relative valuation of that 
firm. Thus, all repurchases by small firms are not necessarily true signals of undervaluation or 
other relevant inside information that would alleviate information asymmetry issues. In fact, the 
credibility of repurchase announcements has received considerable scrutiny in the literature.3 Our 
measure has the advantage of providing a more specific measure of information asymmetry that is 
related to repurchase announcements. Specifically, we determine which share repurchase 
                                                          
3 See for example Babenko et al. (2012). 
13 
 
announcements are ultimately predictive of positive future return performance and thus are the 
most likely cases of relatively high levels of information asymmetry.  
4. Results 
 In order to establish which repurchase announcements involve firms with a relatively 
higher level of information asymmetry, we use firm-by-firm causality regressions of returns and 
repurchases as discussed in Section 3. A summary of the results from these regressions is provided 
in Table 2.  
 In Panel A of Table 2, we regress current period returns on six month lagged returns and 
six month lagged REP (i.e., m = 6 in equation (2)), which is an indicator equal to one if the month 
contained a repurchase announcement and is zero otherwise. There were 8,883 firms repurchasing 
during the 1990-2012 period for which we were able to conduct this test. The mean and median p-
values for the effect of the coefficients on the lagged repurchase terms on current returns are 0.62 
and 0.71, respectively. Thus, the mean and median repurchase announcement is relatively 
uninformed. In fact, only 798 out of 8,883 repurchase announcements are found to have a 
statistically significant (at a minimum of the 5% level) predictive ability for lagged repurchases on 
current returns. Similarly, Dittmar and Field (2013) find that the majority of repurchases are not 
able to time firm undervaluation.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 In Panel B of Table 2, we use REP% as the repurchase variable of interest. REP% is the 
dollar amount of the announced repurchase program divided by the market value of the firm. 
REP% is commonly used in the literature and may better capture the relative size of the 
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repurchase.4 This in turn may provide more specific indications of the information contained in 
the repurchase announcement. Specifically, one would expect that firms repurchasing a relatively 
larger proportion of themselves have relatively more information about the value of their firms. 
 The results in Panel B of Table 2 indicate similar predictive ability of repurchases for future 
returns to the results in Panel A of Table 2. The mean and median p-values are 0.64 and 0.76, 
respectively. Additionally, 679 of the 7,779 firms examined in Panel B of Table 2 are found to 
have a significant effect of lagged repurchases on current returns.5 The results of Panel B verify 
that most repurchases are not informed.  
 While Table 2 establishes a measure of firm-level information asymmetry for repurchase 
announcements, it does not address the market reaction at the time of the announcement. To the 
extent that efficient markets correctly identify repurchase announcements with the most credible 
signals (i.e., those involving firms with the highest levels of information asymmetry), we would 
expect that our information asymmetry measure and abnormal returns would be positively related.   
We examine event CARs for repurchasing firms based on levels of information asymmetry 
in Table 3. Each repurchasing firm is grouped into either the informed or uninformed category 
based on the p-value from firm-level regressions in Table 2. The informed group contains all firms 
with p-values less than 0.05 from the causality regressions. Panel A of Table 3 presents the results 
of tests of differences in mean CAR for repurchasing firms based on whether or not the 
repurchasing firm is classified as informed. We find, regardless of which definition of repurchase 
we use, abnormal returns are higher for informed firms than for uninformed firms. The difference 
                                                          
4 See for example Babenko et al. (2012). 
5 The difference in sample size between Panel A and Panel B of Table 2 is due to the availability of the dollar value 
of repurchases from SDC. 
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in CAR for the event window is 0.57% and 1.02% for REP and REP%, respectively. Thus, firms 
with greater information asymmetry show higher announcement returns. This suggests that the 
market correctly identifies such firms at the time of the announcement. We compare our results to 
those of Dittmar and Field (2013) who examine repurchase announcement returns based on 
information asymmetry as measured by analyst following and dispersion measures. They find that 
firms with greater information asymmetry are more likely to repurchase at relatively low prices, 
which may explain the relatively more positive market reaction to such announcements.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
In Panel B of Table 3, we conduct the same analysis except that we now focus only on 
“small” firms, which we define as firms with below median market value for the sample.6 Firm 
size has been used frequently as a proxy for information asymmetry in the literature previously 
(Vermaelen, 1981; Corwin, 2003; Zhang, 2006). If firm size completely captures elements of 
information asymmetry related to repurchases, then splitting on firm size alone may be enough to 
identify informed repurchases. However, if further splitting the sample based on our information 
asymmetry measure yields a significant difference in announcement returns between the two 
groups, then it suggests that our proxy captures information asymmetry which is particularly 
related to repurchases. We find that the result of Panel A of Table 3 is even stronger in Panel B. 
Specifically, the announcement return is 1.21% and 1.42% higher for informed repurchases using 
REP and REP%, respectively, in the sample using only relatively smaller firms, which are between 
                                                          
6 The median market capitalization in our sample is $224 million. 
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roughly 40% and 100% larger than the difference in CAR in Panel A. This finding suggests that 
firm size may not completely capture information asymmetry related to repurchases. 
In Panel C of Table 3, we focus only on “large” firms, those with above median market 
value for our sample. As hypothesized in Panel B, it may be that firm size captures the relevant 
portions of information asymmetry related to repurchases. However, it may also be true that firm 
size fails to completely capture information asymmetry in this context. The results in Panel C of 
Table 3 indicate no significant difference between announcement returns based on our informed 
indicator for large firms, regardless of the repurchase measure used. Thus, at least amongst larger 
firms, our information asymmetry proxy does not contribute additional understanding relative to a 
simple firm size measure.  
Overall, this result is perhaps not surprising. To the extent that information amongst larger 
firms is relatively more homogenous than the dispersion for smaller firms, our results in Panels B 
and C are expected. It is also possible that larger firms are relatively more likely to undertake 
repurchases for reasons other than undervaluation or other information signaling. This is consistent 
with the fact that announcement returns are substantially lower (i.e., far less than half) across the 
board for larger firms relative to smaller firms. The larger announcement returns for smaller 
repurchasing firms is consistent with Chan et al. (2004). Thus, the market in general is less 
optimistic about the large firm repurchase announcement, which may be due to less new 
information being generated by such an announcement. Still, our causality regression approach 
indicates that roughly 8% of large firm repurchases (using REP%) are informed and the market 
does not capture this at the time of the announcement. The literature frequently uses measures 
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based on analysts as proxies for information asymmetry. We do not focus on these proxies in Table 
3, but control for them explicitly in the regressions to follow in Table 4.   
Table 4 presents regressions similar in spirit to the analysis in Table 3. Specifically, we 
present regression results which use event CARs as the dependent variable. The explanatory 
variables include informed indicators, REP and REP%. The Informed (REP) or Informed (REP%) 
indicates if the informed indicator is based on a repurchase indicator or the relative size of the 
repurchase. REP is an indicator equal to one if the current month contains a repurchase 
announcement and is equal to zero otherwise. REP% is the percent of the firm to be repurchased 
in a given month and is equal to the dollar value of the repurchase divided by the market value of 
the firm in a given month. We control for the size of the repurchase (REP%), firm size (Size), the 
number of analysts following, and the dispersion of analyst forecasts. In short, we test the relation 
between our information asymmetry proxy and announcement abnormal returns after controlling 
for other traditional information asymmetry proxies.   
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Consistent with the difference in means tests in Table 3, the results in Table 4 indicate that 
the informed indicator is positively related to CAR in all 12 specifications (significant at a 
minimum of the 10% level), regardless of the definition of informed (i.e., Informed (REP) or 
Informed (REP%)) or the control variables included. We find that repurchase size (REP%) is 
positively related to announcement CARs (significant at the 1% level in all specifications in which 
it is included). Firm size (Size) is negatively related to announcement CARs (at the 1% level in all 
specifications in which it is included). Consistent with Table 3, this suggests that smaller firms 
show, on average, a higher announcement CAR than larger firms. However, the inclusion of firm 
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size (Size) does not mute the significance of our information asymmetry proxy. The number of 
analysts is negatively related to announcement CARs (at a minimum of 5% level in all 
specifications in which it is included). Thus, consistent with other information asymmetry proxies, 
we find that firms with lower information asymmetry (i.e., higher number of analysts following) 
show lower announcement CARs. Finally, we find that the coefficient on analyst dispersion is not 
statistically significant. In specifications (11) and (12), we include repurchase size (REP%) and all 
information asymmetry proxies (firm size (Size), number of analysts and analyst dispersion) and 
our measure of informed repurchases remains significant at the 5% level. The economic 
interpretation in specifications (11) and (12) indicates that informed repurchases show a 0.76% 
and 0.94% higher CAR, respectively, after controlling for other information asymmetry proxies. 
Thus, it does not appear that traditional information asymmetry proxies subsume our repurchase 
specific information asymmetry measure.   
In addition to the size of the repurchase program, the frequency of repurchase 
announcements may also drive the results documented to this point. This is based on Jagannathan 
and Stephens (2003) and Dittmar and Field (2013), who note that the motivations of frequent 
repurchasers may differ from less frequent repurchasers. Specifically, Dittmar and Field (2013) 
find that firms who repurchase at a higher frequency are not motivated by undervaluation and do 
not purchase at relatively low prices. In their analysis of information asymmetry, Dittmar and Field 
(2013) find that firms with greater information asymmetry are better able to purchase at lower 
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prices. This suggests that firms that repurchase less frequently are relatively better informed.7 We 
confirm this in Table 5. 
In Table 5 we find the CAR drops as the number of repurchase announcements increases. 
For instance, the mean CAR for a firm with only one repurchase announcement in the sample is 
3.24% compared to a CAR of 1.58% for firms repurchasing four times in the sample period. Thus, 
firms that announce repurchases more often have less informative repurchases. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
In Table 6 we run regressions in which announcement CAR is the dependent variable, and 
repurchase informed status (Informed (REP) or Informed (REP%)), repurchase size (REP%), 
repurchase frequency, and traditional measures of firm information asymmetry (i.e., firm size 
(Size), the number of analysts following, and the dispersion of analyst forecasts) are explanatory 
variables. Consistent with Table 5, we find that the frequency of repurchase is negatively related 
to announcement CARs in specifications (1) and (2). However, the inclusion of firm size, the 
number of analysts and the dispersion of analyst forecasts eliminates the significance of repurchase 
frequency.  Finally, including the frequency of repurchase (and including other information 
asymmetry proxies) does not change the relation between our informed indicator and CARs. 
Specifically, consistent with Tables 3 and 4, the informed indicator is positively related to 
announcement CARs even after we control for repurchase frequency and other traditional 
information asymmetry proxies.  
                                                          
7 We note that the frequency of repurchasing in Dittmar and Field (2013) is based on actual repurchases while our 
measure of repurchase frequency is based on announced repurchases.  
20 
 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
The analysis to this point has focused on the relation between our information asymmetry 
proxy and announcement abnormal returns. In Table 7, we extend this approach to examine long-
term abnormal returns.8 This analysis is included to address the potential for factors other than the 
repurchase announcement to drive future performance. For instance, it could be that repurchases 
are more likely during certain periods which are likely to be associated with relatively more 
positive future return performance. The use of long-term abnormal returns controls for systemic 
factors related to returns.  Long-term abnormal returns are calculated using the Fama and French 
(1993) three factors (see equation (1)). We form equally weighted monthly calendar-time 
portfolios for the full sample and also for bifurcated samples based on information asymmetry. We 
report the average monthly abnormal returns and the t-statistic for the event horizons of months 
(+1, +12), (+1, +24), and (+1, +36) following Peyer and Vermaelen (2009).  
We find that for all firms in the sample, the monthly average abnormal returns for the one, 
two and three year event horizons are positive and statistically significant. The average monthly 
abnormal return is 0.34%, 0.27%, and 0.25%, respectively, for the one, two and three-year 
windows. This is consistent with the literature documenting a post repurchase drift anomaly. Next, 
we form portfolios based only on firms in our sample identified as informed based on the 
regressions in Table 2. We find that the average monthly abnormal returns for informed firms are 
                                                          
8 Vermaelen (1981) suggests that under the signaling hypothesis, stock repurchase is a measure to transfer the value 
of information that only the management possesses to current stockholders of the firm, and Vermaelen (1981) also 
provides evidence that abnormal stock returns remain positive in the long-term.  Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and Wang 
(2010) argue that earnings quality can be an indicator of false signaling in stock repurchases, because managers 
sometimes use stock repurchases to manipulate their performance by increasing stock prices. These authors find that 
firms with low earnings quality are more likely to carry out stock repurchases, but the stock performance of these 
firms declines in the long-term.  
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1.65%, 0.84%, and 0.63%, respectively, for the one, two and three-year windows – all of which 
are significant at the 1% level. Thus, the economic magnitude of the long-term abnormal returns 
is between two and four times greater for the sample of informed repurchases compared to the full 
sample. Results are qualitatively identical regardless of the definition of informed repurchases. 
These results are perhaps not surprising given that informed repurchases are identified based on 
regressions of six month lagged repurchases on future returns. Nonetheless, our results indicate 
that informed repurchases continue to outperform the market and other uninformed repurchases 
up to three years following the repurchase announcement. 
We repeat the portfolio formation process based on median levels of firm size, number of 
analysts following, and analyst dispersion. In each case, we create two groups. One group with 
high information asymmetry, the other group with low information asymmetry. Only the firm size 
bifurcation yields monthly abnormal returns that are greater for the high information asymmetry 
group while both analyst variables (i.e., number of analysts following and analyst dispersion) yield 
the opposite result (although economically similar). We find that small firms show average 
monthly abnormal returns of 0.50%, 0.38%, and 0.33%, respectively, for the one, two, and three-
year windows. While these abnormal returns are greater than that of the full-sample, they are 
between half and one-third the size of the abnormal returns of our measure of informed 
repurchases. These findings show that our measure of information asymmetry is more strongly 
related to long-term abnormal returns compared with other traditional information asymmetry 
proxies.  
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
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Our proposed proxy for information asymmetry is based on causality tests. This proxy may 
be related to other conventional information asymmetry proxies after controlling for repurchase 
size and repurchase frequency. Identifying which, if any, variables are related to our information 
asymmetry proxy is potentially useful for two reasons. First, we may identify variables that could 
be used to help predict informed repurchases a priori. Second, examining the extent that our 
information asymmetry measure is related to other factors may help establish the relative 
uniqueness of our measure.  
In Table 8, we examine the relation between whether or not a repurchase is informed 
(dependent variable: Informed (REP) or Informed (REP%)) and other variable such as  repurchase 
size (REP%), repurchase frequency, firm size (Size), the number of analysts following, and the 
dispersion of analyst forecasts.  While our informed indicator uses a measure of information 
asymmetry based on causality tests, the analysis in Table 8 may suggest characteristics of informed 
repurchases that are available a priori.  
The results in Table 8 indicate that repurchase size (REP%) and repurchase frequency are 
not related to informed repurchases when controlling for information asymmetry proxies (see 
columns (5) and (6)). When using an indicator of a repurchase in a given month, rather than the 
relative size of the repurchase, none of the variables considered are related to the informed 
indicator (see columns (1) and (3)). However, when the informed indicator is based on the relative 
size of the repurchase (Informed (REP%)), we find that larger firms (greater analyst dispersion) 
are negatively (positively) related to informed repurchases (see column (6)). Thus, when the 
informed indicator is based on the relative size of the repurchase (Informed (REP%)), firm size 
and analyst dispersion play a complementary role to this measure of information asymmetry. Both 
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firm size and analyst dispersion are available at the time of the repurchase announcement. This 
may allow investors to correctly identify informed repurchases. However, given the abnormal 
return analysis performed above, it does not appear as though the market fully responds to truly 
informed repurchases.   
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
5. Conclusion 
 While the initial average response to the announcement of an open market share repurchase 
is positive, it is less clear which announcements are true signals of positive future performance. 
The signals from an open market repurchase announcement may be more credible in the case of 
firms with relatively high levels of information asymmetry. In such a case, the announcement of 
the repurchase program may bring the level of information possessed by the managers and the 
shareholders closer together.  
 We propose a repurchase specific measure of information asymmetry that is based on time 
series causality tests due to Granger (1969) and Sims (1972). The resulting information asymmetry 
measure is based on the assumption that if repurchase information predicts future returns, then that 
repurchase is informed. When we relate our measure of information asymmetry to abnormal 
returns following the announcement of open market share repurchases, we find that they are 
positively related. Thus, firms with relatively higher levels of information asymmetry are found to 
be relatively more informed repurchasers. This result holds when controlling for traditional 
information asymmetry proxies such as firm size, number of analysts following, and analyst 
dispersion.  Thus, our information asymmetry measure captures information not contained in 
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traditional information asymmetry proxies. Finally, we document that our measure of information 
asymmetry is positively related to long-term abnormal returns for one, two, and three-year 
windows.  
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Appendix: 
Empirical model of a test of asymmetric information based on causality tests (Sims test) 
In this appendix, we provide a simple, parsimonious time-series model in which there is 
potential information asymmetry between informed inside managers and outside investors so that 
we can draw inferences about the market’s reactions to share repurchase announcements. In such 
a case, share repurchase decisions by inside managers may contain (or convey) new information 
about future stock returns. In fact, some share repurchase decisions may be information events 
(i.e., forward-looking), while others may be non-information events (i.e., backward-looking) with 
respect to stock returns. The share repurchase decision will be related to future stock returns when 
it is an informative event under information asymmetry. The idea is that although informed inside 
managers and uninformed outside investors observe the same financial variables such as current 
and past stock returns and fundamentals, uninformed outside investors may not fully recover all 
the information which informed inside managers use in share repurchase.9 Our model is useful 
because it provides a regression model that tests the predictive power of share repurchase under 
potential information asymmetry. 
Here, we utilize a theorem in time-series econometrics, which states that any time-series 
process has both invertible and non-invertible representations [see Fuller (1976, P. 64-66, Theorem 
2.6.4)]. Although stock returns may follow a general ARMA (autoregressive moving average) 
process, for expositional simplicity we assume that uninformed outside investors, observing 
current and past stock returns, infer a first-order moving average, MA(1), process of the returns: 
10 
                 Rt = (1 –  L) ut,         < 1.0 ,                           (A.1) 
where Rt is the stock return at time t, L is the lag (or backshift) operator (i.e., L
n Rt = Rt-n), and ut 
is white noise with var(ut) = u2. The autocovariance functions (ACFs) for this return process are:  
var(Rt) = (1 + 2) u2, 
cov(Rt, Rt-1) = -  u2, 
cov(Rt, Rt-k) = 0, for k  2.                               (A.2) 
 
                                                          
9 We can capture this intuition in a time-series concept of the non-invertibility of the moving average representation 
[see Box and Jenkins (1976, p.69) and Granger and Newbold (1986, p.145)]. 
10  Any higher-order representation of returns yields the same dynamic relationships with more complicated 
computations.  
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          Conversely, suppose that informed inside managers, observing the same current and past 
stock returns, infer the following MA(1) process of the returns: 
            Rt = (1 – -1 L) vt,        < 1.0 ,                                       (A.3) 
where vt is white noise with var(vt) = v2. The ACFs for this return process are: 
var(Rt) = (1 + -2) v2, 
cov(Rt, Rt-1) = - -1 v2, 
 cov(Rt, Rt-k) = 0, for k  2.                              (A.4) 
Note that if we set v2 = 2 u2, the ACFs in (A.2) and (A.4) are identical. Since the return process 
can be identified in practice only by the observed ACFs, the identical ACFs imply that stock return 
processes in (A.1) and (A.3) represent the same return process. That is, for a given return process, 
outside investors and inside managers may infer different MA(1) processes.11 In addition, v2 is 
smaller than u2 because   
     v2 = 2 u2,    and    < 1.0.                                                                  (A.5) 
           This means that the variance of the one-step-ahead forecast error of the return process in 
(A.3) by inside managers would be smaller than the corresponding variance of the return process 
in (A.1) by uninformed outside investors. However, unlike the ut process, the vt process cannot be 
recovered by uninformed investors using information about current and past values of stock 
returns. In sum, although both inside managers and outside investors observe the same (current 
and past) returns, under information asymmetry informed inside managers with a larger 
information set t* = {Rt-j, vt-j, ut-j, for j  0} can forecast future returns better than uninformed 
investors with a smaller information set t = {Rt-j, ut-j, for j  0}. 
We can gain an important alternative insight by comparing the corresponding autoregressive 
representations (ARR) of the moving average representations (MAR) of stock return processes 
{Rt} in (A.1) and (A.3):   
               vt = (1 − λ
−1L)−1Rt = −(λL
−1)(1 − λL−1)−1Rt = − ∑ λ
jRt−j.
∞
j=1                                  (A.6) 
                                                          
11 The return process in (A.1) with the innovation ut is an invertible MAR because the root of the determinant of the 
MAR of Rt is greater than 1 (i.e., det [1- z] = 0, for z = -1). However, the return process with the innovations vt in 
(A.3) is a non-invertible MAR because the root of the determinant is less than 1 (i.e., det [1- -1 z] = 0, for z = ). 

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Note that the innovations {ut} in the uninformed outside investors’ return process are backward-
looking, whereas the innovations {vt} in the informed inside managers’ return process are forward-
looking.   
How is this information asymmetry between inside managers and outside investors related to 
the dynamic relationship between share repurchase decisions by inside managers and stock returns 
(i.e., the predictive power of stock sales)? Suppose that inside managers have an information 
advantage in that they can forecast the firm’s future prospects better than uninformed investors by 
observing vt. If inside managers apply this information to their share repurchase decisions, their 
share repurchase decision, REPt, will be a function of the innovation vt that they observe but 
uninformed outside investors do not:   
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑣𝑡) = ∑ (𝜃𝑖𝐿
𝑖)𝑣𝑡
∞
𝑖=0 = ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑣𝑡−𝑖, with ∑ 𝜃𝑖
2∞
𝑖=0 < ∞.
∞
𝑖=0                               (A.7.1)                     
Then, by using vt in (A.6), the share repurchase variable, REPt, and stock return processes will be 
related as follows: 
  𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑡 = ∑ (𝜃𝑖𝐿
𝑖){(1 − 𝜆−1𝐿)−1𝑅𝑡}
∞
𝑖=0 = ∑ (𝜃𝑖𝐿
𝑖)∞𝑖=0 (− ∑ 𝜆
𝑗∞
𝑗=1 𝑅𝑡+𝑗) = ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑅𝑡−𝑗
∞
𝑗=−∞ , (A.7.2) 
where  for j = -∞, …, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, ….∞ is a function of  and . That is, the share repurchase 
will be a linear combination of future, current, and past returns; thus, it will be forward-looking. 
In practice, since inside managers do not have perfect foresight, (A.7.2) will be  
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑡 = ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑅𝑡−𝑗 + 𝐸𝑡[∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑅𝑡−𝑗
−1
𝑗=−∞ ]
∞
𝑗=0 .                                                                       (A.8) 
 In contrast, suppose that inside managers do not have an information advantage or they 
simply do not make share repurchase decisions based on their information advantage. Then, the 
share repurchase will be a function of ut , the innovation that uninformed outside investors observe: 
 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑢𝑡) = ∑ (𝜃𝑖𝐿
𝑖)𝑢𝑡 =
∞
𝑖=0 ∑ (𝜃𝑖𝑢𝑡−1), with ∑ 𝜃
2∞
𝑖=0 < ∞
∞
𝑖=0  .                        (A.9) 
Then, by using ut in (A.6), stock sale and stock return processes will be related as follows: 
  𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑡 = ∑ (𝜃𝑖𝐿
𝑖)(1 − 𝜆𝐿)−1𝑅𝑡
∞
𝑖=0 = ∑ (𝜃𝑖𝐿
𝑖)∞𝑖=0 {∑ 𝜆
𝑗𝑅 𝑡−𝑗
∞
𝑗=0 } =  ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑅𝑡−𝑘
∞
𝑘=0 ,           (A.10) 
where for k = 0, 1, 2, ….∞ is a function of  and . That is, in this case the share repurchase 
will only reflect the past and current returns and will not be related to future returns; thus, it will 
be backward-looking. To summarize, we have shown that under information asymmetry, 
informative share repurchase decisions are related to not only past and present returns but also 
future returns. By contrast, in the absence of information asymmetry, non-informative share 
repurchase decisions are not related to future returns.  
j i
j
k i
j
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A practical question is how we distinguish between the two -- informative and non-
informative -- types of share repurchase decisions. When an inside manager makes share 
repurchase decision, if it contains new information about future prospects of the firm (i.e., stock 
returns) that is not contained in the current and past values of returns and share repurchase, it is an 
informative (i.e., forward-looking) share repurchase and it is related to future returns. Otherwise, 
it is a non-informative (i.e., backward-looking) share repurchase. We can empirically test whether 
share repurchase decisions are informative or not by using the following proposition. 
The equivalence of the two-sided regression in (A.7.2) with Granger causality has been 
established by Sims (1972, Theorem 2), which we restate in our context: 
Proposition 1. Consider the following two-sided regression: 
 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑅𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑚
𝑗=−𝑚  ,                                                                                               (A.11) 
where E(εt. Rt-j) = 0 for all j (= -m. …-1, 0, 1,… m). If the null hypothesis that all the 
coefficients of future returns are zero (i.e.,  = 0 for all j < 0 ) is rejected, then  Granger-
causes Rt.  
That is, we can use the two-sided regression as a means of testing the predictability of share 
repurchase for market returns, and the finding of the predictive power of stock sale can be 
interpreted based on information asymmetry.  
Equivalently, the Granger causality in (A.11), which is based on the two-sided regression by 
Sims (1972, Theorem 2), can be tested by the null hypothesis that  = 0 for all j < 0 based on the 
following regression, which is based on usual (equivalent) one-sided Granger-causality tests: 
     
          𝑅𝑡 = 𝛾 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑅𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑡−𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑚
𝑗=1   +𝜂𝑡 .                                                                          (A.12)                                     
That is, we can use a one-sided Granger causality test in (A.12) as a means of testing the 
predictability of the share repurchase for stock market returns, and the finding of the predictive 
power of the share repurchase can be interpreted based on information asymmetry. The intuition 
behind this test is that including lagged values of market returns helps us to control for potential 
feedback in share repurchase decisions.  
  
j tS
j
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Table 1. Announcement Returns and Summary Statistics 
 
REP% is the dollar value of the announced repurchase program divided by firm market capitalization. Value 
of Transaction is the dollar value of the repurchase in millions of dollars. CAR (-1, +1) is the cumulative 
abnormal return over the period one day prior to the announced repurchase to one day after the 
announcement. Number of Analysts is the number of analysts following the firm at the time of the 
announcement from IBES. Analyst Dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst estimates at the time of 
the repurchase announcement from IBES. The abnormal returns are calculated using a market model with 
the estimation window of (-252, -44). 
 
  N Mean  Median Min Max S.D. 
REP% 8,232 8.59% 5.90% 0.72% 100% 9.53 
Value of Transaction (Mil) 8,247 168.38 14.97 0 36,200 888.63 
CAR (-1, +1) 8,859 2.77% 1.78% -13.11% 22.82% 8.40 
Number of Analysts 6,518 7.94 5.00 1.00 44.00 7.36 
Analyst Dispersion 5,600 7.49% 4.00% 0% 34.00% 8.78% 
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Table 2. Firm by Firm Regressions 
 
This table presents the results of regressions for each firm having completed a repurchase over the period 
1990-2012. All available firm-months are included in the sample. R is the monthly return for a given firm 
in month t from CRSP. REP is an indicator equal to one if the current month contains a repurchase 
announcement and is equal to zero otherwise. REP% is the percent of the firm to be repurchased in a given 
month and is equal to the dollar value of the repurchase divided by the market value of the firm in a given 
month. 
 
Panel A: REP Regression 
    
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛾 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑅𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑡−𝑗
6
𝑗=1
6
𝑗=1
 
 
  N Mean  Median Min Max S.D. 
F-Stat (REP) 8,833 0.93 0.62 0.04 5.64 0.99 
P-Value (REP) 8,833 0.62 0.71 0 0.99 0.34 
Significant (REP) (p<.05) 798      
Not Significant (REP) (p>=.05) 8,035      
 
Panel B: REP% Regression 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛾 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑅𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝑅𝐸𝑃%𝑡−𝑗
6
𝑗=1
6
𝑗=1
 
  N Mean  Median Min Max S.D. 
F-Stat (REP%) 7,779 0.91 0.56 0.03 5.76 1.03 
P-Value (REP%) 7,779 0.64 0.76 0 0.99 0.34 
Significant (REP%) (p<.05) 679      
Not Significant (REP%) 
(p>=.05) 8,154           
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Table 3. Abnormal Returns and Information Asymmetry 
 
This table presents the results of difference in means tests for each firm having completed a repurchase over 
the period 1990-2012. The announcement abnormal return for the repurchasing firm is compared between 
informed repurchases and non-informed repurchases. CAR (-1, +1) is the cumulative abnormal return over 
the period one day prior to the announced repurchase to one day after the announcement. The abnormal 
returns are calculated using a market model with the estimation window of (-252, -44). Informed is an 
indicator equal to one if the firm causality regression yielded a p-value of < 0.05 for the six months lagged 
terms for repurchases. The (REP) or (REP%) next to Informed indicates if the informed indicator is based 
on a repurchase indicator or the relative size of the repurchase. SMALL is an indicator equal to one if the 
market value of the firm at the time of the repurchase announcement is below the median and is zero 
otherwise. REP is an indicator equal to one if the current month contains a repurchase announcement and 
is equal to zero otherwise. REP% is the percent of the firm to be repurchased in a given month and is equal 
to the dollar value of the repurchase divided by the market value of the firm in a given month. ***, **, and * 
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: All Firms 
  Mean CAR 
Median 
CAR N 
Informed (REP) 3.29% 2.16% 798 
Uninformed (REP) 2.72% 1.77% 8,035 
Difference (REP) 0.57%* 0.39%  
    
Informed (REP%) 3.74% 2.32% 679 
Uninformed (REP%) 2.72% 1.82% 7,100 
Difference (REP%) 1.02%*** 0.50%**   
 
Panel B: Small Firms 
  Mean CAR 
Median 
CAR N 
Informed (REP) 5.14% 3.39% 397 
Uninformed (REP) 3.93% 2.73% 4,008 
Difference (REP) 1.21%** 0.66%*  
    
Informed (REP%) 5.43% 3.69% 357 
Uninformed (REP%) 4.01% 2.86% 3,492 
Difference (REP%) 1.42%*** 0.83%**   
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Panel C: Large Firms 
 
  Mean CAR 
Median 
CAR N 
Informed (REP) 1.45% 0.79% 401 
Uninformed (REP) 1.52% 1.11% 4,027 
Difference (REP) -0.07% -0.32%  
    
Informed (REP%) 1.88% 1.06% 322 
Uninformed (REP%) 1.46% 1.13% 3,608 
Difference (REP%) 0.42% -0.07%   
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Table 4. Abnormal Returns and Information Asymmetry Regressions 
This table presents the results of regressions for each firm having completed a repurchase over the period 1990-2012. The announcement abnormal 
return for the repurchasing firm is the dependent variable. Specifically, CAR (-1, +1) is the dependent variable and is the cumulative abnormal return 
over the period one day prior to the announced repurchase to one day after the announcement. The abnormal returns are calculated using a market 
model with the estimation window of (-252, -44). Informed is an indicator equal to one if the firm causality regression yielded a p-value of < 0.05 
for the six months lagged terms for repurchases. The (REP) or (REP%) next to Informed indicates if the informed indicator is based on a repurchase 
indicator or the relative size of the repurchase: REP is an indicator equal to one if the current month contains a repurchase announcement and is 
equal to zero otherwise. REP% is the percent of the firm to be repurchased in a given month and is equal to the dollar value of the repurchase divided 
by the market value of the firm in a given month. REP% is also used for repurchase size.  Size is the market value of the firm at the time of the 
repurchase. No. of Analysts is the number of analysts following the firm at the time of the announcement from IBES. Anal. Dispersion is the standard 
deviation of analyst estimates at the time of the repurchase announcement from IBES. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Informed (REP) 0.558*  0.704**  0.653**  0.819**  0.841**  0.760**  
 (0.311)  (0.315)  (0.310)  (0.346)  (0.367)  (0.363)  
Informed (REP%)  1.019***  0.960***  0.815**  1.018***  1.121***  0.941** 
  (0.330)  (0.329)  (0.325)  (0.367)  (0.392)  (0.388) 
REP%   13.207*** 13.439*** 9.477*** 9.568*** 10.112*** 10.362*** 10.792*** 11.117*** 8.414*** 8.621*** 
   (1.694) (1.747) (1.689) (1.741) (1.898) (1.968) (2.063) (2.147) (2.052) (2.133) 
Size     -0.731*** -0.758***     -0.834*** -0.878*** 
     (0.048) (0.050)     (0.089) (0.093) 
No. of Analysts       -0.100*** -0.107***   0.043** 0.044** 
       (0.013) (0.014)   (0.020) (0.021) 
Anal. Dispersion         1.246 0.761 1.301 0.719 
         (1.207) (1.251) (1.195) (1.238) 
Constant 2.724*** 2.718*** 1.672*** 1.683*** 6.053*** 6.203*** 2.421*** 2.472*** 1.273*** 1.302*** 6.362*** 6.659*** 
 (0.093) (0.098) (0.161) (0.166) (0.329) (0.340) (0.210) (0.218) (0.202) (0.209) (0.518) (0.538) 
Observations 8,845 7,790 8,203 7,789 8,203 7,789 6,388 6,044 5,497 5,185 5,497 5,185 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.009 0.035 0.037 0.015 0.016 0.006 0.007 0.028 0.031 
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Table 5. Abnormal Returns and Repurchase Frequency 
CAR (-1, +1) is the cumulative abnormal return over the period one day prior to the announced repurchase 
to one day after the announcement. The abnormal returns are calculated using a market model with the 
estimation window of (-252, -44). The reported results are based on the number of repurchases a given firm 
has announced during the sample period 1990-2012. 
  One Rep Two Rep Three Rep Four Rep 
CAR (-1, +1) 3.24% 2.46% 1.92% 1.58% 
N 4,495 3,074 1,110 212 
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Table 6. Information Asymmetry and Repurchase Frequency Regressions 
This table presents the results of regressions for each firm having completed a repurchase over the period 
1990-2012. The announcement abnormal return for the repurchasing firm is the dependent variable. 
Specifically, CAR (-1, +1) is the dependent variable and is the cumulative abnormal return over the period 
one day prior to the announced repurchase to one day after the announcement. The abnormal returns are 
calculated using a market model with the estimation window of (-252, -44). Informed is an indicator equal 
to one if the firm causality regression yielded a p-value of < 0.05 for the six months lagged terms for 
repurchases. The (REP) or (REP%) next to Informed indicates if the informed indicator is based on a 
repurchase indicator or the relative size of the repurchase.  REP% is the percent of the firm to be repurchased 
in a given month and is equal to the dollar value of the repurchase divided by the market value of the firm 
in a given month, and used for repurchase size. Rep. Freq. is the number of repurchase programs announced 
by a given firm during the sample period. Size is the market value of the firm at the time of the repurchase. 
No. of Analysts is the number of analysts following the firm at the time of the announcement from IBES. 
Anal. Dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst estimates at the time of the repurchase announcement 
from IBES. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Informed (REP) 0.689**  0.758**  
 (0.314)  (0.363)  
Informed (REP%)  0.902***  0.923** 
  (0.329)  (0.388) 
REP% 12.672*** 12.893*** 8.401*** 8.602*** 
 (1.695) (1.748) (2.052) (2.133) 
Rep. Freq. -0.597*** -0.617*** -0.128 -0.157 
 (0.115) (0.123) (0.133) (0.142) 
Size   -0.820*** -0.864*** 
   (0.091) (0.094) 
No. of Analysts   0.045** 0.046** 
   (0.020) (0.021) 
Anal. Dispersion   1.165 0.544 
   (1.204) (1.248) 
Constant 2.713*** 2.734*** 6.495*** 6.836*** 
 (0.257) (0.267) (0.537) (0.561) 
Observations 8,203 7,789 5,497 5,185 
R-squared 0.011 0.012 0.028 0.031 
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Table 7. Long-term Abnormal Returns and Information Asymmetry 
This table presents long-term abnormal return results based on various definitions of information 
asymmetry. Mon. AR is the monthly average abnormal returns of equally weighted calendar-time portfolios 
using the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model. Each firm that has announced an open market repurchase 
during the last, 12, 24, or 36 months (depending on the window examined) forms the calendar-month 
portfolio. A time-series regression is run in which the dependent variable is excess return and the return on 
the three factors are the independent variables (market excess return, high-minus-low, and small-minus-
big). Different samples are created prior to portfolio formation based on various information asymmetry 
measures as follows. Informed (Uninformed) refers to firms for which the causality regression yielded a p-
value of < 0.05 (>= 0.05) for the six months lagged terms for repurchases. The (REP) or (REP%) next to 
Informed indicates if the informed indicator is based on a repurchase indicator or the relative size of the 
repurchase. Small (Large) refers to firms below (above or equal to) the median market value of firms in our 
sample at the time of the repurchase. Low Analyst (High Analyst) refers to firms with above (below or 
equal to) the median number of analysts following the firm at the time of the announcement from IBES. 
High Dispersion (Low Dispersion) refers to firms with above (below or equal to) median standard deviation 
of analyst estimates at the time of the repurchase announcement from IBES.  ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Months (+1, +12)   Months (+1,+24)  Months (+1, +36) 
  Mon. AR T-Stat   Mon. AR T-Stat   Mon. AR T-Stat 
Full Sample 0.34% 2.28**  0.27% 1.93*  0.25% 1.87* 
Informed (REP) 1.65% 4.51***  0.84% 3.49***  0.63% 2.99*** 
Uninformed (REP) 0.20% 1.80*  0.21% 1.99**  0.21% 2.08** 
Informed (REP%) 1.65% 4.45***  0.90% 3.84***  0.72% 3.48*** 
Uninformed (REP%) 0.24% 1.68*  0.22% 1.60  0.22% 1.65 
Small 0.50% 3.12***  0.38% 2.64***  0.33% 2.47** 
Large 0.09% 0.64  0.15% 1.10  0.17% 1.25 
Low Analyst 0.38% 2.53**  0.28% 2.15**  0.26% 2.10** 
High Analyst 0.45% 2.94***  0.33% 2.29**  0.28% 2.03** 
High Dispersion 0.32% 1.97*  0.17% 1.15  0.15% 1.00 
Low Dispersion 0.58% 5.11***   0.49% 4.99***   0.46% 4.91*** 
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Table 8. Determinants of Informed Repurchases 
This table presents the results of regressions for each firm having completed a repurchase over the period 
1990-2012. Informed is the dependent variable and is an indicator equal to one if the firm causality 
regression yielded a p-value of < 0.05 for the six months lagged terms for repurchases. The (REP) or 
(REP%) next to Informed indicates if the informed indicator is based on a repurchase indicator or the 
relative size of the repurchase.  REP% is the percent of the firm to be repurchased in a given month and is 
equal to the dollar value of the repurchase divided by the market value of the firm in a given month, and 
used for repurchase size. Rep. Freq. is the number of repurchase programs announced by a given firm 
during the sample period. Size is the market value of the firm at the time of the repurchase. No. of Analysts 
is the number of analysts following the firm at the time of the announcement from IBES. Anal. Dispersion 
is the standard deviation of analyst estimates at the time of the repurchase announcement from IBES. ***, **, 
and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Informed 
(REP) 
Informed 
(REP%) 
Informed 
(REP) 
Informed 
(REP%) 
Informed 
(REP) 
Informed 
(REP%) 
REP% 0.025 0.103* 0.024 0.093 0.096 0.112 
 (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.081) (0.080) 
Rep. Freq.   -0.002 -0.011*** -0.000  
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)  
Size     -0.005 -0.009*** 
     (0.004) (0.003) 
No. of 
Analysts     0.089 0.126 
     (0.078) (0.077) 
Anal. 
Dispersion     0.005 0.008*** 
     (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.088*** 0.079*** 0.091*** 0.098*** 0.122*** 0.148*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.023) (0.022) 
Observations 7,811 7,420 7,811 7,420 4,961 4,687 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004 
 
